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I. INTRODUCTION

The retention of discretion in the application of the rule [requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies] constitutes a continuing
invitation to litigation. It is this factor more than any other, which
has resulted in an incrustation of case-law about an essentially
simple rule. Were the exhaustion requirement rigorously applied
in each instance, much of this wasteful litigation would soon be
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cut off at the source.'
Sixty-two years later, these words cannot be more true. Since the time this
statement was written, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has
continued to be plagued with difficulty in its application. Courts still struggle with
when and how the doctrine should be applied.
The exhaustion doctrine forbids a plaintiff from filing an action for judicial
review before going through the appropriate administrative process.2 If Congress
has not clearly provided for exhaustion, courts have discretion in determining
whether to require parties to exhaust administrative remedies before allowing
judicial review. 3 To make such a determination, courts look to the policies
underlying the exhaustion doctrine as well as the congressional intent behind the
applicable statute.4 This process becomes flawed when courts try to apply the many
court-made exceptions to the doctrine. In two recent opinions from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Judges Haden and
Chambers have held that plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies
when they seek relief under the citizen suit provision of the Surface Mining and
Reclamation Act.5 Both of these cases demonstrate the struggle trial courts have in
determining whether to require a plaintiff to exhaust their administrative remedies
before seeking judicial review.
The first part of this note examines the principles behind the exhaustion
doctrine and the court made exceptions to the doctrine. As will be discussed, these
exceptions create the inconsistent application of the doctrine. Part two looks at how
courts apply those exceptions when Congress has not clearly articulated an
exhaustion requirement.
II. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
There are several ways individuals may participate in the administrative
process. One way is to challenge proposed rules and regulations during the agency
rulemaking process. 6 Another is to ask the agency to hold a hearing on the

Raoul Berger, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies, 48 YALE L. J. 981, 1006 (1938).
2

See McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).

3

See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 501-502 (1982).

See 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2000). See also Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22077 (S.D. W.Va. October 9, 1998); Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Castle, No. 3:00-0058 (S.D. W.
Va. May 1,2000) (order denying motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
5

6

See Marcia P. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:

Lessons from Environmental

Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1984). Agency rulemaking refers to the formal process where
individuals are given notice and opportunity to submit information regarding a proposed rule which the
agency then considers in promulgating a final rule. See generally 5 U.S.C. §553.
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contested issue. If the individual is not satisfied with the decision of the agency at
the hearing level, the individual may appeal to an appellate body within the
agency.8
A.

Early Decisions That Shaped the Exhaustion Doctrine

The exhaustion doctrine is a creation of the judiciary applied to cases that
involve administrative process. 9 The doctrine grew out of several cases in which
plaintiffs sought equitable relief. 1 ° Some of these cases contained language similar
to the underlying principles that now provide the foundation for the exhaustion
doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court, in FederalTrade Commission v. Claire
Furnace Co.,1 denied plaintiffs the right to an injunction because there was an
adequate right to appeal through the administrative process. This case involved the
Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") issuance of an order requiring a number of
companies in coal, steel, and related industries to file documents related to their
business.12 The companies did not comply with the order but instead filed suit in
district court seeking an injunction to stop the FTC from enforcing the order. 13 The
Court noted that orders issued by the FTC are subject to review by the Attorney
General and once he acts, the companies have the opportunity to contest the legality
of any proceeding against them. 14 Because this right is adequate, the companies
were not entitled to an injunction and therefore would have to challenge the FTC's
s
order through the administrative process before seeking judicial review.
Another early case is Lawrence v. St. Louis-San FranciscoRy. Co.16 where

See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 5.
See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 6.

10

See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
See United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904) (The statutes regarding citizenship provide "a

mode of procedure which must be followed before there can be a resort to the courts."); Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274 (1924); United
States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U.S. 457 (1934) (The statute provided steps to be taken which "constitute
parts of the administrative process which must be completed before the extraordinary powers of a court of

equity may be invoked."); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937). One article commented
that the exhaustion doctrine was shaped by "the need for orderly procedure, the requirements of comity, and
the tendency to assimilate the doctrine to the rule that a litigant has no standing in equity where he has an
adequate remedy at law." Berger, supra note 1, at 983.
11

274 U.S. 160 (1927).

12

See id.

13

See id.

See id. at 173. The Court also recognized that this process of allowing the Attorney General to
review the Trade Commission's orders provided a "sifting out of the mass of inquiries" which would relieve
the courts and prevent unnecessary deliberation on these issues. Id.
14

15

See id.

16

274 U.S. 588 (1927).
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the Supreme Court referred to "irreparable injury," 17 an exception to the current

exhaustion doctrine.1 8 This case concerned the validity of a state statute that gave
the state's Corporation Commission authority to remove certain railway stations.1 9
Citizens against the removal filed a motion with the Commission requesting a
hearing on the decision to remove a station in their town.20 Before the Commission
could hold a hearing, the railway brought suit seeking injunctive relief to prohibit
the Commission from compelling the railway to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Commission. 21 The court entered an injunction that prohibited the Commission
from taking any action on the citizens' motion.22 The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's order finding that there was no evidence that the railway would suffer
irreparable injury by submitting to the administrative process, as a prerequisite to
issuing an injunction.23
The Supreme Court in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding24 for the first time
formally referred to the rule requiring exhaustion. Myers involved a challenge to
the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") authority to hold a hearing on
whether an employer was engaged in unfair labor practices.2 5 Upon an allegation
that the company was engaging in unfair labor practices, the NLRB filed a
complaint against Bethlehem Shipbuilding and notified the company that the matter
had been set for a hearing.26 Bethlehem filed two bills of equity in district court
seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit the NLRB from
holding the hearing. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court
had jurisdiction to grant the requested injunction.2 8 The NLRB then appealed to the
Supreme Court.29
Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court in which he stated "the
long-settled rule of judicial administration [is] that no one is entitled to judicial
relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrativeremedy

17

Id.

18

See infra Part II.C.5.

19

See Lawrence, 274 U.S. at 590.

20

See id.

21

See id.

22

See id.

23

See id. at 592.

24

303 U.S. 41 (1938).

25

See id.

26

See id.

27

See id.

28

See id. The Supreme Court noted that at the time the First Circuit determined it had jurisdiction

over the issue, every other circuit court had held to the contrary. See id. at 44.
29
See Myers, 303 U.S. at 41.
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has been exhausted."30 Although the rule had never been stated in such a fashion,
Justice Brandeis cited a long list of equity opinions in which he stated the rule had
been most frequently applied.3 ' Justice Brandeis went further stating that "the rules
requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy cannot be circumvented by
asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests is groundless or that the...
prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable damage. 32
Although Justice Brandeis's opinion in Myers seemed to say that
exhaustion requirements are to be universally applied,33 the rule has since been
modified to allow judicial discretion.34 Exhaustion requirements are controlled by
congressional intent.3 If Congress has not clearly required exhaustion in
legislation, courts must use their discretion in determining whether exhaustion
should apply.' "In determining whether exhaustion is required, federal courts must
balance the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial
forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion., 37 This
balancing is done by looking at the policies underlying exhaustion and the
congressional intent behind the applicable statute.3a However, the Supreme Court
"has long acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed
administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts."3

30

Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).

31

See id. at 51 n.9. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 U.S. 32 (1898); Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Dalton v.'State Corp. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 699 (1915); Gorham
Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 265 (1924); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S.
160 (1927); Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927); Chicago, M., St. P. & R.R.
Co. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567 (1928); St Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 279 U.S.
560 (1929); Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932); U.S. v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 291 U.S.
457 (1934); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934). In the same footnote, Justice Brandeis
noted that "because the rule is one ofjudicial administration - - not merely a rule governing the exercise of
discretion - - it is applicable to proceedings at law as well as suits in equity." Meyers, 303 U.S. at 51 n.9.
Thus began the doctrine's use in cases not only involving cases in equity but also in cases containing issues of
law.
32

Id.

33

See id.

34

See McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).

35

Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 501-502 (1982).

See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 193. Judicial discretion does not apply to cases brought pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act because of the Supreme Court's decision in Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137
(1993). In Darby the Court held that "with respect to actions brought under the APA, Congress effectively
codified the doctrine ofexhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. at 153. The Court also noted that judicial
discretion still governs cases not governed by the APA. Id. at 153-154.
37
Volvo v. United States, 118 F.3d 205,209 (4th Cir. 1997).
3

38

See Patsy,457 U.S. at 502.

39

McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145.
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PoliciesFavoringExhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies

Policies favoring exhaustion can be broken into four general categories.4 °
The first two categories concern administrative interests. These include agency
autonomy and allowing the agency to apply its expertise to the issue. 41 The second
two categories involve judicial interests. These include promoting judicial economy
and aiding judicial review.42 The Supreme Court summed up the policies behind the
exhaustion doctrine best when it stated:
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional
experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for
regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so
even though the facts after they have been appraised by
specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences
to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the
regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured,
and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies
that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight
gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.43

1.

Agency Autonomy

The exhaustion doctrine respects administrative autonomy by allowing the
agency to resolve an issue without involving the courts. The exhaustion doctrine
recognizes that agencies, not courts, should have the primary responsibility for the
programs which Congress has charged them to administer." This view reinforces
the notion that agencies are separate entities vested with powers and duties in
which courts should not interfere until the agency has completed its action or
According to Professor Davis, a well respected authority on administrative law, there are six
policies favoring exhaustion: (1) an agency is created for the purpose of applying a statutory scheme to
particular factual situations by developing facts, applying its expertise, and exercising discretion, (2) allowing
the agency to perform its functions without interruption is more efficient than permitting judicial intervention
at each phase, (3) agency autonomy, (4) judicial review is aided by allowing the agency to develop the facts
of a particular case, (5) the agency is allowed to correct its own mistakes so that court appeals may be
reduced, (6) Finally, without requiring exhaustion parties may be encouraged to circumvent the process which
would reduce the efficiency of the agency. KENNETH CULP DAVIS AND RICHARD J. PIERCE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.2, at 309 (3d ed. 1994).
41
See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 10-1I.
40

42

See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 11.

43

Far Eastern Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-575 (1952).

44

See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145. See also Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
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clearly exceeded its jurisdiction.45 Therefore, courts should not undercut the
agency's authority by stepping into actions that should properly be resolved
through the administrative process.46 Agency autonomy is particularly important
where the agency has been vested with certain discretionary powers. 47
2.

Agency Expertise

Exhaustion also allows the administrative agency "to act within the sphere
of its special competence, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors. 4 8
Congress delegates to agencies the power to oversee special areas in which the
agency has special knowledge. By requiring individuals to exhaust their
administrative remedies, agencies may apply this knowledge and expertise.
For example, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
supported this policy by applying agency expertise when it upheld a district court
ruling that plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies when seeking tribal
recognition from the Department of Interior. 49 The court reasoned that the
Department of Interior had established a division composed of historians,
anthropologists and genealogists to determine whether groups seeking tribal
recognition actually constituted Indian tribes and that the special division had
reviewed numerous petitions and had gained much experience in this area.50
The court examined a prior ruling by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
a similar case where that court held that individuals seeking tribal recognition need
not defer to administrative expertise. 51 The D.C. Circuit, however, noted that at the
time of the prior decision, the Department of Interior had not instituted final
regulations nor developed any special expertise in the area. 52 Since the agency had
subsequently developed expertise on the issue, the agency should
53 be given the
opportunity to apply its expertise before courts would grant review.
Allowing agencies to apply their expertise also allows them to correct their
own mistakes. 54 "When an agency has the opportunity to correct its own errors, a
45
46

See McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
See id. "[F]requent and deliberate flouting of administrative process could weaken the

effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures." Id.
47

See id. at 194. See also JAFFE, supra note 44, at 425.

48

Mullins Coal Co. v. Clark, 759 F.2d 1142, 1145 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Weinberger v. Bentex

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973) (stating "[t]hreshold questions within the particular expertise
of an administrative agency are appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its hand.").
49
See James v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 824 F.2d 1132, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
50

See id. at 1138.

51

See id.

52

See id (citing Mashpee v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir. 1979)).

53

See id.

54

See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969).
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judicial controversy may well be mooted, or at least piecemeal appeals may be
avoided."5 5 If citizens were allowed to go directly to federal court without affording
agencies an opportunity to correct mistakes, there would be premature interference
with the agency's process which could prevent the agency from operating
efficiently in the long term. -6
There are several advantages to allowing agencies to correct their own
mistakes. First, self-correction promotes public faith in the agency.5 7 This is
important because of the agency's regulatory role. If citizens do not believe that the
agency can reach correct decisions, then they will not want to put their trust into the
administrative process. 58 Second, exhaustion provides the benefits of obtaining less
expensive administrative relief rather than relying on more expensive judicial
relief.5 9 Finally, self-correction causes the agency to be better informed as to how
its own decisions affect citizens.6 0
3.

Judicial Economy

The exhaustion doctrine also promotes judicial economy because the
controversy is left with the agency and not taken to court.61 If the complainant gets
a satisfactory decision with the agency process, then the issue is resolved.62
Conversely, if the complainant is not satisfied with the agency's decision, then the
court gets the benefit of the agency's record and factual findings.63 Courts will
generally defer to the agency's findings of fact, as well as the agency's decision if
administrative exhaustion is followed.6 This leads to more accurate decisions by
upholding the application of the agency's expertise especially to complex factual
issues. 5
4.

Judicial Review

Exhaustion aids judicial review because the agency, through the

55

See id.

56

See id. at 193-194.

57

See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 16.

58

See id.

59

See id.

60

See McKar, 395 U.S. at 195.

61

See id.

62

See id.

63

See id. at 195.

64

See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 12.

65

See id. at 22.
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administrative process, will have developed a record for the court to review.r To
that end, agencies serve as factfinders.6" Some would argue that without the
exhaustion requirement some disputes might result in an incomplete factual
record. 68 This is even more likely to occur in situations involving complex factual
determinations or where the dispute involves the agency's special expertise.69
Further, the agency's experts can review the material more efficiently and can
evaluate the information more accurately than courts because of agency expertise in
the subject matter.7"
C.

Exceptions to the ExhaustionDoctrine

Although exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally preferred,
there are exceptions to the doctrine. In McCarthy v. Madigan, the Supreme Court
recognized three circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh
heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion.71 McCarthy was a federal
prisoner who filed suit alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by four
73
prison employees 72 pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown FederalNarcotics Agents.
The District Court dismissed the suit because McCarthy failed to exhaust prison
administrative remedies. 74 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's dismissal observing that Bivens actions are creations of the
75
judiciary, which in turn allows courts to impose reasonable conditions upon them.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the ruling of the Court of Appeals, noted three
general areas where parties are not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief.76 The first three exceptions listed below are
those given by the Supreme Court in McCarthy. The Supreme Court recognized the
additional two exceptions in other cases.

6

See Robert Power, Help is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problemand the Ripeness
Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 547, 555 (1987).
67
See id.
68

See id.

69

See id.

70

See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 16.

71

72

See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146-49 (1992).
Id. at 142

73

403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (stating that a federal law cause of action for money damages could be

inferred from the Fourth Amendment).
See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 142.

74

75

See id. at 143.

76

See id. at 146-49.
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Prejudice to Subsequent Judicial Review

Individuals are not required to exhaust administrative remedies where
resort to those remedies may prejudice a subsequent judicial challenge of the
involving this exception focus on the delay to the claimant
agency action. Cases
78
in obtaining relief.
2.

Inadequate Administrative Remedy

Individuals are not required to exhaust administrative remedies when the
agency's remedy may be inadequate "because of some doubt as to whether the
agency was empowered to grant effective relief."79 The focus on whether a remedy
would be inadequate is whether the administrative remedy is "calculated to give
relief commensurate with the claim., 80 This may occur where there is doubt as to
whether the agency can grant effective relief.81 For example, a claimant who
produces purely factual questions is not required to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies where those remedies "expressly forbid the examination
and cross-examination of witnesses.' 82 Inadequate remedy may also occur when the
claimant challenges the validity of an agency regulation. 83 A claim that an
administrative procedure is inadequate or unavailable must be shown by clear
evidence.a4
3.

Agency Bias

If the administrative remedy would be inadequate because the
administrative agency is shown to be biased or to have otherwise predetermined the
issues before it, exhaustion is not required.85 An example of agency bias is where
the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the legal proceedings. 86 In Gibson v.

See id. at 146-147 (stating that prejudice could be found from unreasonable or indefinite
timeframe from an administrative action).
78
See id.at 147, (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973)).
77

See McCarthy, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (holding that exhaustion was not required in this case because
the administrative remedy would be inadequate).
80
See JAFFE, supra note 44, at 426.
79

81

See id.

82

See Piano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 598 (2nd Cir. 1974).

83

See id.

United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424, 430 (1966). Clear evidence means
highly probable or reasonably certain. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999).
See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 148.
85
84

86

See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
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Benyhill,87 independent practitioners of optometry filed charges with the Alabama
Board of Optometry alleging that other optometrists employed by Lee Optical
Company had engaged in unprofessional conduct in violation of the Alabama
88
optometry statute and, therefore, were practicing their profession unlawfully.
Because of a change in the applicable statute, the complainants contended that the
practice of optometry by individuals of business corporations was no longer
permissible in Alabama and that the alleged violators were in violation of the ethics
of their profession. 0
The alleged violators filed suit in district court seeking an injunction
against the administrative hearings alleging that the Board was biased.90 During the
course of trial, it was discovered that the Alabama Board of Optometry was
composed solely of optometrists in private practice and that the aim of the Board
was to revoke the licenses of all optometrists in the state who were employed by
business corporations. 91 A three-judge panel entered judgment for the plaintiffs
enjoining the Board from conducting the hearing and from revoking the plaintiffs'
licenses. 92 Although the Supreme Court vacated the District Court's judgment, the
Court noted that "those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings
should not adjudicate these disputes. 9 3
4.

Futility

Exhaustion is also not required where administrative remedies would be
futile.' The futility exception is based on the principle that requiring exhaustion
would not serve the underlying principles of the doctrine.95 Evidence of futility can
be found in several forms including "bad faith on the part of the agency, past
patterns of an agency's decision making, the agency's position on the merits of a
case in litigation over exhaustion, or other statements by the agency on the issue."'
Futility should not be found when there is an unfavorable past pattern of decision

87

411 U.S. 564 (1973).

88

See id. at 567.
See id.

9D

See id. at 569-570.

91

See id. at 578.

92

See Gibson, 411 U.S. at 570.

93

Id. at 579 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 5 10(1927)).

94

See Mullins CoalCo., 759 F.2d at 1146.

95

See Gelpe, supranote 6, at 20.

See id. at 40. Another area in which a court might find futility occurs is when a party challenges
an agency's procedures based on constitutional claims. The argument here would be that the agency is not
authorized or competent to resolve constitutional questions. However, exhaustion on this issue should not be
given lightly because the agency could resolve other issues that could moot the constitutional issue. See id.
9
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making on the part of the agency. 97 The rationale for this is that a litigant cannot
forum shop if one forum has ruled unfavorably on the same issue in the past. 98
Some courts have found futility when the agency is committed to denying relief
due to precedent, regulation, or policy.99 Courts however have taken both sides on
this issue.100
5.

Irreparable Injury to the Complainant

Another exception to the exhaustion doctrine arises when exhaustion
would cause irreparable injury to the complainant. 1 To constitute irreparable
injury, the injury must be both unusual and not capable of being corrected through
later review.10 2 The harm therefore must be great and more importantly
permanent. 10 3 Courts usually do not apply this exception. 1°4 One reason is that
irreparable injury focuses on the hardship of the plaintiff which leads to a narrow
construction of the exception.' 0 5 Another reason is the court's reluctance to excuse
exhaustion.'0 6
The Supreme Court, on more than one occasion, has held that the mere
expense of participation in the administrative process does not constitute
irreparable injury. 10

7

For example in Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil

of California, °8

Co.
Standard Oil argued that it would be irreparably harmed by the
expense and disruption of defending itself in administrative proceedings.' °9 The
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a complaint against Standard Oil
97

See id. at 40.

98

See id.

99

See Power, supra note 66, at 581.
See id. at 581. "Courts may view challenges to regulations as definitely futile or not futile, and the

100

same court may seem to take a strict view in some cases and a lenient one in others."
101
See id. at 590.
102

See id. at 591. Loss of employment without more is insufficient to constitute irreparable injury.

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974). See also Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See id. at 592. "Obviously, the rules requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy cannot be
circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests is groundless and that the mere
holding of the prescribed administrative hearing would result in irreparable damage." Myers, 303 U.S. at 51.
103

104

See Power, supra note 66, at 590.

105

See id. at 592.

106

See id. at 594.

107

See Myers v. Bethlehem, 33 U.S. 41 (1938). See also Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing

Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222
(1938) ("[T]he expense and annoyance of litigation is 'part of the social burden of living under
govemment.").
108

449 U.S. 232 (1980).

109

See id. at 244.
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alleging that it was participating in methods of unfair competition or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 110
Standard Oil brought suit in federal court alleging that the FTC issued the
complaint without the necessary "reason to believe" that it was violating the Act.11'
Standard Oil sought an order to have the complaint declared unlawful which would
require it to be withdrawn. 12 To excuse its nonperformance in the administrative
process, Standard Oil argued that it would suffer irreparable injury if required to
submit to the administrative process. 1 3 The Court held that irreparable
14 injury does
not result even if the expense would be substantial or unrecoverable.
D.

Criticismof Exceptions to the Exhaustion Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court announced a seemingly clear doctrine in

Myers, when it stated that "no one is entitled to judicial relief

. . .

until the

prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted,"'115 exceptions to the
exhaustion doctrine have created a conflict of when and how to apply the doctrine.
Two fundamental problems arise when approaching an exhaustion question. One
problem occurs in how courts apply the balancing approach to an exhaustion issue
and the other problem arises in how courts apply the other closely related judicial
doctrines of ripeness and finality.
1.

Balancing Approach

The balancing tests used by courts when Congress has not specifically
required exhaustion lead to inconsistent treatment of the doctrine. 16 As stated
previously, courts balance the interests of the individual against the policies
favoring exhaustion. 1 7 One law review article noted, "the current trend in the law
is to go beyond recognizing stated. .. exceptions, and instead determine whether to
require exhaustion by weighing various considerations as applied to a particular
case.' 18 Admittedly, some exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine are required for
those cases that are clearly unique. However, the exceptions themselves have led to
inconsistent application of the exhaustion doctrine, which creates uncertainty about
110

See id. at 234.

See id. at 235.
112

See id.

113

See StandardOil,449 U.S. at 244.

114

See id. See also Myers, 303 U.S. 41; RenegotiationBd., 415 U.S. 1; Petroleum Exploration,Inc.,

304 U.S. 209.
115

Myers, 303 U.S. 41.

116

See Gelpe, supra note 6, at 26.

117

See Volvo, 118 F.3d at 209

118

Gelpe, supranote 6, at 26.
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whether exhaustion requirements apply in turn increasing litigation over whether
exhaustion is necessary.119 The irony is that the agency must go to court and argue
that the plaintiff should be required to exhaust, and if exhaustion is not required,
that the plaintiff should lose on the merits of his or her claim. 120 The litigation itself
then would create futility. 121 Nonetheless, the courts adhere in some form or
another to the court made exceptions.
Another problem with the balancing test used by the courts is the fact that
the exceptions are not readily and fully defined.' 2 The Supreme Court uses terms
such as "futility," "irreparable injury," "inadequate remedy," or "agency bias," yet,
most of the time the Court does not define what these terms mean. This allows
lower courts to easily bypass the doctrine without addressing the underlying
policies the doctrine is supposed to protect.
2.

Closely Related to Other Judicial Doctrines

Courts also struggle in applying the exhaustion doctrine because it is
closely associated to other doctrines related to timing of judicial relief, namely
ripeness and finality.1 23 The ripeness doctrine is "used to determine whether a
statute or rule is susceptible to judicial review before it is enforced and to determine
whether an announcement of an agency position in a relatively informal document
is appropriate for judicial review."' 24 Like the exhaustion doctrine, the ripeness
doctrine looks at similar factors in determining the availability of review including
the court's interest in avoiding unnecessary litigation, the agency's concern over
forming its policy before a regulation is subject to review, and the petitioner's
interest in timely review of an agency action. 2 5 However, the focus of the ripeness
doctrine is on the institutional relationship between the court and agency and the
competence of the court to decide the issue without further agency review, while
the focus
of the exhaustion doctrine is on the position of the party seeking
126
review.
The doctrine of final agency action focuses on the conclusion of activity by
the agency.127 This doctrine often overlaps with failure to exhaust administrative

119

See id. at 27.

120

See id.

121

See id.
at 30.

122

See id. at 26.

123

See DAVIS, supra note 40, at 305.

124

Id. at 306.

125

See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

126

See id.

127

See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 669 F.2d 903, 908 (3rd Cir.

1982). Many cases depend upon whether particular actions of the agency are final. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (Informal opinion letter of the
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remedies.' 2 8 If the issue does not involve a final action by the agency, then the
petitioner has not exhausted his or her administrative remedies. 29 While both
doctrines may be similar, they are analytically distinct in the sense that "[o]ne
requirement may [be] applicable even when the other is not."'1 30 For example, a
party may pursue all administrative steps available, yet not receive a final agency
order. 131 Similarly, an agency order may be final for purposes of appeal, but the
party has not pursued his or her administrative remedies to the end.132
A perfect example of how a court struggled in deciding which doctrine to
apply is Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC.'3 3 In Ticor, three members of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals wrote three separate opinions that all came to the same
conclusion, yet their conclusions were based on one of the three distinct
doctrines.134 The plaintiffs in Ticor filed suit seeking a declaration that section 5(b)
of the Federal Trade Commission ActO3 is unconstitutional and an injunction
against the prosecution against them initiated by the FTC.'3 6 The district court
dismissed the claim holding that it was not ripe
for adjudication. 137 The plaintiffs
138
Appeals.
of
appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling, however, each judge based his or her decision on a different doctrine. 139
Judge Edwards held that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their available
administrative remedies and therefore could not raise their constitutional claims
until the administrative process was complete. 40 Judge Edwards noted that the
plaintiffs raised a constitutional challenge with the court, while at the same time
had other nonconstitutional defenses to the complaint brought by the FTC that were
Secretary of Commerce sent to President regarding the census is not a final agency action since the
Secretary's opinion is not binding upon the President.). A few Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that an
order to suspend an action is not a final agency action. See Nor-Am Agric. Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d
1151 (7th Cir. 1970); Dow Chemical Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1973); Pax Co. of Utah v.
United States, 454 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1972).
128
See DAVIS, supranote 40,at 306.
129

See id.

130

Association of Nat'l Adver. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Leventhal, J.,

concurring).
131

See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 669 F.2d at 908.

132

See id.

133

814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

134

See id.

135

15 U.S.C. §45(b) (1982).
See Ticor, 814 F.2d at 732.

137

See id See also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 625 F. Supp. 747 (D. D.C. 1986).

138
139

See id
See id.

140

See id.
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ongoing through the administrative process. 141 Because the plaintiffs did not
present facts sufficient to fit into any of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine, the plaintiffs had to wait until their administrative remedies
were
142
exhausted before raising their constitutional challenge in federal court.
Judge Williams, on the other hand, based his opinion on the doctrine of
finality. 143 Judge Williams noted that courts have often mingled the doctrines of
administrative exhaustion, finality, and ripeness, but that each doctrine is
analytically distinct.144 "While exhaustion is directed at the steps a litigant must
take, finality looks to the conclusion of activity by the agency.' 45 Judge Williams
noted that under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiffs could not seek judicial
review because the agency had not issued a final order.146 A final order imposes an
obligation or denies a right. 147 Because the plaintiffs constitutional challenge did
not arise from an administrative order that imposed some obligation on the
plaintiffs or denied them a legal right, the decision of the district court should be
14
upheld.

Judge Green, however, based her opinion on the ripeness doctrine. 149 The
ripeness doctrine looks at the "fitness of the issues for judicial determination and
the hardship to the parties that would result from granting or denying review."' s
The test to be applied in a ripeness inquiry is twofold: a court must evaluate "both
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.'' In this case, plaintiffs' constitutional claim was
fit for review, but the plaintiffs failed to show any hardship that would occur if the
court did not review their claim.' 52 Therefore in Judge Green's opinion,
the district
153
court's decision to dismiss the case as unripe should be affirmed.
Although courts attempt to consider the doctrines of administrative
exhaustion, finality and ripeness distinctly, Ticor shows how courts struggle with
applying these doctrines to particular cases. All three doctrines focus on the timing
141

See Ticor, 814 F.2d at 732.

142

See id.at 743.

143

See id.at 745 (Williams, J., concurring).

144

See id.

145

Id. at 746.

146

See Ticor, 814 F.2d at 746.

147
148

Id.
Id. at750.

149

Id. (Green, J., concurring).

150

Id.at735.

151

See Ticor, 814 F.2d at 736 (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)).

152

Id.at 756.
Id.
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of judicial review and all three may deny judicial relief. However, courts
sometimes use them interchangeably. The problem is magnified when a court using
the exhaustion doctrine must look to whether a particular case fits into a recognized
exception. To resolve the confusion regarding exhaustion, courts should move
more towards requiring exhaustion in all cases with no exceptions.
III. CITIZEN SUITS UNDER THE SURFACE MINING

AND RECLAMATION ACT
In two recent cases before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, two different classes of plaintiffs brought suit under the
citizen suit provision of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA")
challenging permitting decisions made by the West Virginia Division of
Environmental Protection ("WVDEP").' 54 SMCRA is a comprehensive statute that
was enacted to oversee mining operations nationwide.1 55 As part of the statute, a
state could implement its own program and assume exclusive jurisdiction over the
regulation of surface mining.SMCRA established a detailed administrative process in which coal
operators and citizens may challenge an agency action. 157 For example, operators
have the opportunity to challenge the issuance of a cessation order which requires
operators to stop mining.'5 Citizens have the opportunity to challenge the issuance
of permits by submitting written objections with the agency and requesting a
conference with the agency. 159 In both examples, either the operator or concerned
citizen is entitled to an administrative hearing if not satisfied with the results. 60
In both cases filed with the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, the plaintiffs brought suit without first submitting to the
administrative process. 16' Had these cases been dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the plaintiffs would have been sent back to a state agency
to seek relief before heading to court.
See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp.2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), rev'd No. 99-2443, 2001 WL
410382, (4th Cir. 2001); Ohio River Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Castle, No. 3:00-0058 (S. D. W. Va. filed Jan.
20,2000) (hereinafter "OVEC).
See H.R. REP. 95-218 (1977).
155
154

30 U.S.C. § 1253; West Virginia has an approved state program and has promulgated laws
regulating mining that mirror the requirements of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act. West Virginia's
mining laws are codified at W.VA. CODE §22-3-1 to -32 (1998).
157
See generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
156

158

30 U.S.C. § 1275.

159

30 U.S.C. § 1263.

160

30 U.S.C. §§ 1275 and 1263.
See Defendant Castle's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, OVEC v.

161

Castle, (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (No. 3:00-0058).
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Bragg v. Robertson

In the first case, Bragg v. Robertson,162 a group of plaintiffs filed suit
alleging among other things that the Director of the WVDEP had engaged in a
pattern and practice of violating non-discretionary duties under SMCRA regarding
buffer zone regulation. 63 The WVDEP argued that the suit should be dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 64 After reviewing
the Supreme Court's decisions on the exhaustion doctrine, the court looked to the

relevant portions of SMCRA to determine whether the Act required exhaustion. 165
The Court first examined 30 U.S.C. § 1276, which governs judicial review of
actions by the state program. 66 Section 1276(e), states:
Action of the state regulatory authority pursuant to an approved
state program shall be subject to judicial review by a court of
competent jurisdiction in accordance with state law, but the

availability of such review shall not be construed to limit the
operation of the rights established in Section 1270 of this title
except as provided therein. 67
Section 1270, the citizen suit provision of SMCRA, requires 60 day written notice
before a complaint can be filed. 68 Concentrating on the second half of section
162

Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077 (S.D. W. Va. October 9, 1998).

163

Id. Plaintiffs named as a defendant, Michael Miano, Director of the WVDEP.

Additionally,

Plaintiffs named the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and several officers with the Corps. The scope of this
article only focuses on how the court's opinion interpreted SMCRA and how it affects the WVDEP.
164
Id. The Defendants, also, argued that the suit should be dismissed because the complaint did not
state a claim for which relief could be granted, lack ofjurisdiction, and that the statute of limitations had run.
Defendant Miano also argued that the suit should be dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment prevented
the Plaintiffs from suing an agency of the state. Id.
165
The court limited its review to the citizen suit provision and did not address other suits arising

under SMCRA. See Bragg, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at * 17 n.7.
Id.
167

30 U.S.C. § 1276(e) (emphasis added).

168

Id. Section 1270 states in relevant part:
(a) Civil action to compel compliance with this chapter
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action on his own behalf
to compel compliance with this chapter
(2) against the Secretary or the appropriate State regulatory authority to
the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution where
there is alleged a failure of the Secretary or the appropriate State
regulatory authority to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the Secretary or with the appropriate State
regulatory authority.
(b) Limitation on bringing of action.
No action may be commenced (1) Under subsection (a)(1) of this section -
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379

1276, the Court interpreted the statute as carving out an exception to the exhaustion
requirement. 16 9
The Court determined that Congress had provided the citizen suit option
1 70
not only to offer citizens relief, but to also supplement agency regulation. The
Court's analysis, however, rests only on statutory interpretation and congressional
doctrine. 17 1
intent and did not address any of the policies behind the exhaustion
The Court focused primarily on three things to excuse exhaustion. First,
the Court found that Congress had rejected a bill that would eliminate the citizen
73
suit provision.' 72 Second, Congress did not prohibit collateral attacks1 filed
against the governing agency, even though collateral attacks were prohibited on
permits. 174 The Court noted that by reading the congressional history, Congress's
1 75
The Court then
clear intent was to prevent collateral attacks only on permits.
attacks on
to
collateral
not
object
did
and
contemplated
Congress
assumed that
76
agency.'
the
against
filed
permits
Third, the plaintiffs were not challenging particular permits as alleged by
the defendants. 77 The Court relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiffs were
challenging several permits.178 The Court stated that requiring plaintiffs to
challenge each permit through the agency would almost be impossible to bring to
(A) prior to sixty days after the Plaintiff has given notice in writing of the violation (i)
to the Secretary, (ii) to the State in which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged

violator; or

(B) if the Secretary or the State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil
action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the
provisions of this chapter, or any rule, regulation, order, or permit issued pursuant to

169
1998).

this chapter, but in any such action in a court of the United States any person may
intervene as a matter of right; or
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given
notice in writing of such action to the Secretary, in such manner as the Secretary shall by
regulation prescribe, or to the appropriate State regulatory authority, except that such
action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case where the
violation or order complained of constitutes an imminent threat to the health or safety of
the plaintiffor would immediately affect a legal interest of the plaintiff.
See Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077 (S.D. W. Va. October 9,

170

Id.

171
1998).

See Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077 (S.D. W. Va. October 9,

172

Id.

173

A collateral attack challenges a judgment entered in a different proceeding by bringing a separate
action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 255 (7th ed. 1999).
174

Id.

175
176

Id.
Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077 (S.D. W. Va. October 9, 1998).

177

Id.

178

Id.
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the attention of the courts. 179 However, this analysis fails to take into consideration
the burden on the agency, which the Court should have addressed before rendering
its decision. Taken together, the Court held that "[p]laintiffs need not exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a citizen suit complaint alleging agencies
have engaged in a pattern and practice of violations. '1 80
B.

Ohio River Valley Environmental Coalitionv. Castle

Similar to Bragg, plaintiffs in Ohio River Valley Environmental Coalition
v. Castle18' brought suit claiming that Director Castle engaged in a pattern and
practice of violating non-discretionary duties imposed by SMCRA 82 Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that Michael Castle, Director of the WVDEP,18 3 failed to conduct
cumulative hydrologic impact assessments
(CHIA)'8 for proposed mining permits
81 5
before approving such permits.
Director Castle filed a motion to dismiss the suit arguing that the court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. 188 He argued that exhaustion is important in the CHIA
process because of the complex science involved in evaluating the probable
hydrologic consequences of proposed mining operations. 187 Director Castle further
argued that the duty to conduct a cumulative hydrologic impact assessment
and
188
how that assessment is conducted is a discretionary duty left to the Director.
Relying entirely on Judge Haden's opinion in Bragg, Judge Chambers held
that plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing
suit. 8 9 The court noted that similar to Bragg, plaintiffs in this case were
challenging several permits. 90 Just like Bragg, Judge Chambers opinion does not
179

Id.

180

Id.

181

OVEC v. Castle, No. 3:00-0058 (S. D. W. Va. filed Jan. 20, 2000).

182

Id.

183

Michael Castle replaced former Director Michael Miano prior to the filing of this lawsuit.

184

State regulations require the director to make an assessment of the "probable cumulative impacts

of all anticipated coal mining on the hydrologic balance in the cumulative impact area", and determine "that
the proposed operation has been designed to prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the
permit area." See W. VA. CODE ST. R. tit. 38.
185
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, OVEC v. Castle, (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (No. 3:00-0058).
186

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, OVEC v. Castle, OVEC v. Castle, (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (No. 3:00-

0058).
187

Id

188

Id.

189

OVEC v. Castle, No. 3:00-0058 (S.D. W. Va. May 1, 2000) (order denying motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
190
Id. at 7. The Court stated that "[p]ursuing these allegations in the administrative review of each

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol103/iss3/7

20

Donnellan: Exhaustion Doctrine Should Not Be a Doctrine with Exceptions

THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

2001]

discuss the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine as part of his decision that
the plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review.' 91
The Court in addressing Director Castle's argument that the CHIA
determination is discretionary commented that although the Director is vested with
certain discretion as to the final decision on a permit, he must consider certain
matters and put them in writing. 192 The Court further commented that "[w]hile the
assessment of hydrologic impact and a finding that no material damage will result
may be discretionary conclusions in a permitting discussion, the process by which
those conclusions are reached, the information to be considered, and the detail and
substantiation of the final written approval are not.' '193 Judge Chambers concluded
that the process of reporting a CHIA determination on proposed mining permits is a
nondiscretionary duty and, therefore, not subject to exhaustion. 94
C.

Why The Exhaustion DoctrineShouldHave Been Applied
1.

Adequate Administrative Remedies Were Available

Both of these decisions fail to address the administrative remedies
available under SMCRA.' 95 Specifically, both courts failed to address 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1263 and 1264. Under sections 1263 and 1264, any person with an interest in the
issuance of a mining permit has three options.)96 First, an individual can file written
objections to a proposed permit with the West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection (WVDEP). 197 Second, an individual can attend informal conferences

permit decision would be insurmountable obstacle to access to a federal judicial forum." Id. Judge Chambers
seems to be saying that the plaintiffs would not be able to get adequate relief from the administrative process
or that the agency is biased against plaintiffs' argument. However, this is not clear from the opinion.
191
Id.
192
OVEC v. Castle, No. 3:00-0058 (S.D. W. Va. June 15, 2000) (order denying motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim).
193

Id

194

See id.

195
See generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. Although West Virginia has an approved state program
and has promulgated laws similar to the federal SMCRA that regulate mining, both Courts maintained that
the federal SMCRA created federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, this section only examines those
portions of the federal SMCRA that provide adequate administrative remedies. West Virginia has adopted
similar administrative remedies to SMCRA which are codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-3-20 (requiring public
notice, written objections, public hearings and informal conferences for mining permits); W. VA. CODE § 223-21 (If an informal conference is held, the Director must give written finding granting or denying permit);
W. VA. CODE § 22B-1-7 (Appeals to Board); W. VA. CODE § 22B--9 (General provisions for judicial
review).
See 30 U.S.C. §§1263-1264 (1994).
196
197

See 30 U.S.C. §1263(b).
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conducted by the WVDEP in the area of the proposed mining. 98 Finally, an
individual can request a formal administrative hearing within thirty days of a final
decision by the WVDEP regarding a permit application. 99
Section 1264(f) requires an individual to submit to the administrative
process before judicial review becomes available. 2° Section 1264(f) provides in
pertinent part:
Any applicant or any person with an interest which is or may be
adversely affected who has participated in the administrative
proceedings as an objector, and who is aggrieved by the decision
of the regulatory authority ...shall have the right to appeal. 20 1
The exception to this section comes into play only if the agency fails to process a
permit application or any objections to an application made within the time frame
provided by the Act. 20 2 Therefore, this section makes clear that individuals must
participate in the administrative process before obtaining judicial review of a
permitting decision.
By allowing plaintiffs to bypass this detailed process, the decisions in
Bragg and OVEC have effectively usurped the WVDEP's ability to issue mining
permits. Essentially, a potential plaintiff need only challenge a number of permits
to bypass the administrative process prescribed by the Act. 20 3 The plaintiffs in both
Bragg and OVEC did not administratively challenge any of the alleged defective
permits before bringing suit in district court.20 4 Had they been required to
participate in the administrative process, WVDEP may have corrected some of the
alleged errors raised by the lawsuits or at least been made aware that there may be a
problem with its permitting requirements.
Additionally, the congressional history of SMCRA is not as clear as both
opinions suggest it to be. When explaining the citizen suit provision, Congress
stated: "This section is not intended to override the specific provisions of this bill
which provide more precise requirements for citizen participation in the permit
application and performance bond proceedings., 205 This illustrates that both courts
should have looked more closely to the policies behind the exhaustion doctrine
198

See id.

199

See 30 U.S.C. §1264(c).

200

See 30 U.S.C. §1264(0.

201

Id.(emphasis added).

202

See id.

203

Brief for Appellant at 48, Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Ass'n, No. 99-443, 2001 WL 410382 (4th

Cir. 1999).
204

See Defendant Castle's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, OVEC v.

Castle, (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (No. 3:00-0058).
205

S.REP. No. 95-128, at 88 (1977).
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before rendering their decisions.
2.

Other Courts Have Required Exhaustion Under Other Sections of
the Act

Other courts have required exhaustion under other provisions of SMCRA.
In Mullins Coal Co. v. Clark,06 the Fourth Circuit held "section 1276 clearly
requires that judicial review be limited to the administrative record." 20 7 A notice of
violation had been issued against Mullins Coal Company for a landslide in a fill
bank that had extended beyond the permit area.20 8 After the abatement period had
20 9
expired, the inspector issued a cessation order for failure to correct the violation.
Mullins Coal Company simultaneously filed an appeal with the agency as well as a
complaint with the district court.210
The Fourth Circuit recognized that allowing plaintiffs to bypass the
administrative process would frustrate the legislative purpose, in turn rendering
section 1275 unnecessary. 21'
The Court noted that Congress had taken into account the serious effect a
cessation order would have on the industry and people employed by the industry as
well as the effect on the environment if mining operations were allowed to
continued unabated.212 SMCRA balances both of these needs.213 The court also
noted that section 1276 "clearly requires that judicial review be limited to the
administrative record and214that a company first pursue administrative relief before
seeking judicial review."
The Third and Sixth Circuits have also come to the same conclusion. In
Graham v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement,215 the Third
Circuit held that section 1268(c)216 of SMCRA required exhaustion of the
206

759 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1985).

207

Id. at 1146.

208

See id.

209

See id.

See id. Section 1275 provides permittees and other persons who may be affected by a notice or
order to apply for review of the order or notice. Upon application, the Secretary is required to conduct an
210

investigation and hold a hearing on the notice or order. In addition, an applicant can request temporary relief
pending resolution of the review.
See Mullins, 759 F.2d at 1145.
211
212

See id.

213

See id.

214

Idat 1146.

215

722 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1983).

216

Section 1268(c) provides:
Upon the issuance of a notice or order charging that a violation of this chapter has
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administrative appeal process. 217 In Graham, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of section 1268(c) which requires an operator who has been
sanctioned with a penalty by the Office of Surface Mining to pay the proposed
amount of the penalty into escrow to preserve his right to appeal with the Office of
Surface Mining and ultimately through the courts.2 18
The Third Circuit held that SMCRA provides an operator with sufficient
opportunity to challenge a proposed penalty without prepayment into escrow so
that it does not offend due process. 219 The Court pointed to the three stages of
review by the Office of Surface Mining that allows an operator to challenge a
proposed penalty. 220 First, an operator can seek review when a notice of violation
has been issued.22' Second, an operator may seek review when a cessation order has
222
been issued.
Finally, an operator can seek review of the proposed assessment of a
223
penalty.
22 4
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Shawnee Coal Company v. Andrus,
stressed the administrative system provided in SMCRA. Shawnee Coal Company
sought injunctive and declaratory relief in response to the Secretary's issuance of
cessation orders against its tipple operations. 225 The Court examined section 1275
in detail. 226 It noted that a person adversely affected by a notice or order may apply
for administrative review by the Secretary. 22 7 If the application for review involves
28
a cessation order, the Secretary must issue a written decision within thirty days.2

217

occurred, the Secretary shall inform the operator within thirty days of the proposed
amount of said penalty. The person charged with the penalty shall then have thirty days
to pay the proposed penalty in full or, if the person wishes to contest either the amount
of the penalty or the fact of the violation, forward the proposed amount to the Secretary
for placement in an escrow account. If through the administrative or judicial review of
the proposed penalty, it is determined that no violation occurred, or that the amount of
the penalty should be reduced, the Secretary shall within thirty days remit the
appropriate amount to the person, with interest at the rate of 6 percent, or at the
prevailing Department of the Treasury rate, whichever is greater. Failure to forward the
money to the Secretary within thirty days shall result in a waiver of all legal rights to
contest the violation or the amount of the penalty.
See id.

218

See id.

219

See id.

220

See id.

221

See Graham, 722 F.2d at 1110.

222

See id.

223

See id.

224

661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981).
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.

228

See id.
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Any notice or order that has not been decided within thirty days expires. 229 Further,
an operator may apply for temporary relief that requires a decision within five days,
and if23 0relief is denied, the operator may seek immediate relief with the district
court.

The Court held that "[i]n the Surface Mining Act, Congress provided a
well-defined administrative system for resolution of enforcement actions stemming
from cessation orders. 231
Bypassing the administrative remedies would impair the
expeditious resolution of disputes and result in the forfeiture of
administrative expertise. By circumventing the proscribed
procedures, quick resort to the district court could easily preclude
the Secretary from building a factual record, from clarifying or
narrowing the dispute, or from resolving the controversy
altogether so as to obviate the necessity of judicial intervention.232
The Court recognized that agency expertise is especially important when
applying or interpreting a statute. 2 3
In the Bragg and OVEC decisions review was limited to whether the
exhaustion requirement applies to a citizen suit and did not address other suits
arising under SMCRA. 234 These opinions should have considered the application of
SMCRA in other types of cases. Thus exhaustion would have been required, which
in turn would permit a consistent application of SMCRA.
3.

Opinions Did Not Address The Policies Of The Exhaustion
Doctrine

Both decisions also failed to adequately address the aforementioned
policies of exhaustion. Even though in Bragg the court quoted a portion of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Bowen v. City of New York,235 in which the Supreme
Court stated "the ultimate decision of whether to waive exhaustion ... should be
guided by the policies underlying the exhaustion requirements," 236 the Southem
229

See Shawnee Coal Co., 661 F.2d at 1087.

230

See id.

231

Id.at 1093.

232

Id. at 1091.

See Shawnee Coal Co., 661 F.2d at 1093. "[I]he Interior Board of Surface Mining Appeals is an
activity connected with a surface coal mining operation depends on the particular factual circumstances of
each case." Id.
234
See Bragg v. Robertson, No. 2:98-0636, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22077 (S.D. W. Va. October 9,
233

1998).
235

476 U.S. 467 (1986).

236

Id.at 484.
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District Court's opinion in Bragg gave cursory treatment to those policies as
applied to the facts of the case.23 t As stated before, courts prefer the exhaustion
requirement. 23 " A fair interpretation of the citizen suit provision 23 9 would be to
require individuals to meet a high standard, before allowing parties to sidestep
exhaustion requirements. However, the Bragg and OVEC decisions gave the
doctrine cursory treatment by determining there was another exception to the
exhaustion doctrine, besides those already acknowledged by the courts.
An important piece in the exhaustion analysis is the injury to the plaintiff.
If exhaustion would substantially limit that person's availability of relief, then that
person is entitled to judicial review.240 In the Bragg and OVEC cases, the plaintiffs
alleged a WVDEP pattern and practice of violating non-discretionary duties under
SMCRA. In those circumstances, there was not a present injury, only a threat of
injury through the continued pattern and practice alleged in the complaints. The
plaintiffs, therefore, could have been required to exhaust their administrative
remedies first without experiencing irreparable harm and at the same time retain
their access to judicial review.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to provide a mechanism for
promoting the administrative process while allowing individuals to seek judicial
review of agency decisions. This purpose of the doctrine is best served if applied
stringently because of the benefits of the administrative process. Judicially
developed vague exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine have led to an inconsistent
application of the doctrine by the courts. Although exceptions may be necessary,
the exceptions as applied lead to uncertainty and increased litigation. Until the
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine are clarified, courts will continue to struggle
in applying the doctrine and the parties involved undoubtedly will suffer.
Rebecca L. Donnellan"
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See McCarthy v. Madigan, 502 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
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See 30 U.S.C. § 1270.
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See supra Part II.C.
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